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Wednesday, February 23, 2005

Syrian survival strategy

Farid N. Ghadry, president of the Reform Party of Syria, has an interesting analysis and solution to the problems of Syria in The Washington Times:

What we are facing here is standard Syrian survival strategy of exporting trouble to be able to better retain control at home. What the Syrian regime is saying is that you can have democracy or stability, but you cannot have both. That is why the Syrian Ba'athists are destabilizing Iraq and Lebanon to create havoc and so discredit these fragile democracies. A sectarian war in Iraq between Sunni Arabs, Shiia Arabs and Kurds would suit Syria just fine and conveniently tie up the United States for the foreseeable future. Similarly, chaos in Lebanon justifies a continued Syrian presence. The U.S. response to this strategy of defiance and destabilization should be to regard the killing of Mr. Hariri as a massive Syrian miscalculation, an opportunity to change policy for the better. The United States must not allow Syria to commit murder and then escape retribution by laying low and hoping that the diplomatic storm will pass. If such an approach is taken, then Damascus will surely strike again. The next U.S. step, following the withdrawal of the U.S. ambassador in Damascus, must be to open a front against the Syria Ba'athists in their own backyard. Not a military front, far from it, but a popular civilian offensive. The United States should aim to create the same disequilibrium in Syria that the Syrian Ba'athists so readily encourage elsewhere. The United States has no need to mobilize its own troops, but should, instead, seek to mobilize Syrians. The Reform Party of Syria, along with other Syrian opposition groups, can mobilize thousands of people for acts of civil disobedience within Syria. To do so, we will need U.S. support. Alone, we will suffer the same fate as the Lebanese. With U.S. assistance, however, we can hold the Ba'athist regime accountable for its crimes at home and abroad. As Mohammad al-Douri, then Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations said on April 10, 2003, the day after Saddam's statue came down in Baghdad, 'The game is over.' If the United States gives the Syrian opposition its backing, the game will be over in Damascus as well.
His analysis of Syria's motivations and fears seems very accurate to me. I am unsure of exactly what he is envisioning with his plea for U.S. assistance though. If it is diplomatic protection, public support for any acts of civil disobedience and strong denounciations of any Syrian crackdowns on the opposition I am good with that. If it is covertly arming rebel groups inside of Syria I am hesitant. Too many times we have seen the 'meet the new boss, same as the old boss' phenomenon for me to quickly jump into supporting and internal opposition in a military fashion without a whole lot more knowledge than I currently possess. I also wonder if anything less would have much impact on Syria. It would be interesting however to, if other options prove futile, to take a look at an 'Afghanistan' strategy with U.S. Air cover and Special Ops deployed with a Syrian insurgency against the Baathists. Certainly the idea that we are willing to undertake such a strategy could make it unneeded to do so if that is communicated clearly to the Syrian regime. I don't believe we should bluff though, if we say we will do x if you don't do y we had better be prepared to follow through. History tells us that George W. Bush shares my philosophy here, so if I was Syria I wouldn't count on him bluffing.


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